Governing the Use-of-Force in International Relations: The by Aiden Warren, Ingvild Bode (auth.) PDF

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Extra info for Governing the Use-of-Force in International Relations: The Post 9/11 US Challenge on International Law

Example text

90 Indeed, aside from these minor changes, the rhetoric of the Charter remains the same as that drafted in San Francisco in 1945. The Charter regime, however, has not remained static but, to the contrary, has been modified through a process of what can be defined as evolving reinterpretation. In other words, through informal and continuing means UN institutions and members provide contextual significance to the terms and principles incorporated in the Charter’s text. Specifically, the General Assembly has expanded on Charter norms governing the use-of-force in several resolutions, in particular, the Declaration on Friendly Relations (1970), the Definition of Aggression (1974) and the Declaration on the Use-of-force (1987).

8 Preemption, on the other hand, aims to disrupt an actual imminent military threat. It is an attempt to seize the military initiative in order to gain strategic advantage, ideally through surprise attack, and to avoid conceding the initiative to the adversary which could have possibly disastrous results. 9 Preemption, in the most basic sense, is nothing more than a quick draw. ”11 As stated again by Levy: [P]re-emption involves the initiation of military action because it is perceived that an adversary’s attack is imminent and that there are advantages to striking first or at least in preventing the adversary from doing so .

Est l’objet d’une agression armée” – which literally translates to “in the case where a member . . 38 In essence, proponents of the restricted construction of Article 51 argue that the phrase “if an armed attack occurs” has been construed by many analysts as being “if, and only if [emphasis added], an armed attack occurs,”39 assertive measures of self-defense are permitted only after an armed attack has started (the “principle of the second blow”40 ). ’”41 In addition, advocates of the broader interpretation argue that the French text, referred to in the above, is not articulated in conditional form.

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